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any one, but that it is, therefore, 'the welling up of a race-life' is the grossest mythology. The only thing brought to light by the facts to which he points is that many adolescents are extremely suggestible, and that under a certain type of influence, such as that afforded by some of the evangelical churches, their vague impulses are, through suggestion, given definite form. The organization of one's impulses in this manner may be so striking and sudden as to seem to the subject like the bursting upon him of a larger life. It is a larger life, if it brings him to a fuller consciousness of the significance and interrelation of the facts of his experience. He may, as a result, have a better organized individuality, but it is, mind you, his *own* personality, changed in some direction or other by suggestion, rather than any racial life showing itself.

Discussions of conversion, such as that referred to above, seem to ignore the fact that their conclusions are based on a very limited and selected type of youths, and that outside this class, that is, in the case of the average youth who does not come under a certain kind of religious teaching, conversions do not occur in any appreciable degree. How could this remarkable lack be explained according to the hypothesis we are criticizing except by the admission that in some youths the life of the race does not 'well up.' The fact is that conversion is *not* a universal nor a particularly natural experience (the question is begged, if it is urged in reply, that conversion may be gradual if not sudden, and hence may well be universal), but an induced one. The same is almost certainly true of the so-called 'storm and stress' of adolescence. We repeat that to call it the surging up of the larger life of the race is something other than a psychological statement.

The psychology of religion should, then, investigate the concepts, emotions and attitudes of the individual which are commonly called religious, interpreting them in relation to the other facts of consciousness. For the psychologist, God is not a postulate nor a factor in the production of the religious life. He is one of the concepts of some religious lives, and as such needs explanation. So of all the other objects with which the religious mind constructs or describes its universe of values.

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PANPSYCHISM AND MONISM

PANPSYCHISM appeals to our sympathies in many ways, but in none more strongly than in its claim to have given a monistic solution of the psychophysical problem. In place of the two

streams of mental and physical events, paradoxically sundered and still more paradoxically parallel, panpsychism puts a single reality mental in its nature, and of which the physical order is the symbol or phenomenon.

At the recent congress of philosophers at Geneva M. Flournoy criticized the panpsychists on the ground that the monism which they propound is methodologically useless because it is merely verbal. The puzzling duality of physical and psychical is in no way overcome by calling the one reality and the other phenomenon. From the standpoint of common sense and practical life, says M. Flournoy, we shall continue to treat mind and matter as interacting substances quite in spite of our inability to explain how interaction between two such disparate entities is possible. From the standpoint of science, on the other hand, we shall continue to treat psychical and physical as mutually exclusive but parallel streams of phenomena, and this again quite in spite of our inability to explain how two such disparate orders of events can be parallel. These two forms of dualism, with all their objections and regardless of the many refutations that have been leveled against them, continue to flourish *because they are methodological necessities* from the standpoints, respectively, of common sense and of science. The three forms of monism which would supplant these dualisms are: (1) materialism, (2) panpsychism and (3) agnosticism, or the doctrine that both physical and psychical are phenomena of an unknown substance. With these views considered merely as unproved metaphysical theories M. Flournoy has no quarrel. What he does very strongly protest against is the claim that any one of them is in any sort a remedy for the interaction paradox of the common-sense attitude or of the parallelism paradox of the scientific attitude, or in any way a mediator between these. The panpsychist does not give any satisfactory answer to his self-imposed question, 'Why has the mind a body?' because he can point to nothing in the psychical series that in any way helps us to conceive how the physical series could depend upon or originate from it.

In his reply to M. Flournoy's criticism¹ Professor Strong attempts to give a specific answer to the question which he and other panpsychists are rightly accused of having left unanswered—the question of why the mind has a body—or (to formulate the question from the standpoint of panpsychism): *How is it that minds come to attribute to one another bodies which they do not really have?*

His answer, if I understand it, runs somewhat as follows: Assume

¹ Both criticism and reply are printed in the *Archives de Psychologie*, Nov., 1904.

the system of bodiless minds in which the panpsychist believes, and assume, furthermore, that these minds act upon one another and tend to evolve ever more favorable variations. Now in this system it will be very strongly to the interest of any evolving mind to know its fellows representatively and symbolically rather than directly and as they are. And as the symbols or ideas become more efficacious they will *pro tanto* become more unlike the realities to which they refer. Thus by a kind of natural selection we should expect those minds to survive in the struggle for existence who had best attained the faculty of knowing other minds in wholly unmental terms. The physical conceptions which we actually have of the external world are seen to be precisely what would have arisen if such an evolution had actually taken place. We might add that the animistic view of nature which is held by savages and children denotes a stage of development intermediate between the primeval type of knowledge and the type of knowledge of the modern mathematical physicist. The atomistic and mechanical conception of the latter is perfectly effective for predicting and controlling nature simply because its symbols are so completely denuded of all resemblance to reality. Thus we may understand why and how it has come about that each mind appears to its neighbors to be clothed with a body and to exist as a physical object in space.

This hypothesis of Professor Strong's, of which I have here given the merest outline, should be welcomed by all panpsychists. It is a new and daring explanation of the genesis of the physical from the psychological. It appeals strongly to the sympathies of our day by reason of its use of biological categories. The experience of the physical world is a survival of the fittest. It is a useful illusion, a veil which keeps us from being blinded by a too intimate view of the souls that surround us. Berkeley, when facing the same problem which M. Flournoy presents to Professor Strong, was compelled to invoke the Deity to account for the phenomenon of purely physical ideas inhering in a purely psychological being. Professor Strong, like Laplace before him, has no need of that hypothesis—the principle of natural selection takes its place. His new theory is indeed nothing less than the Darwinization of Berkeley.

Yet with all its attractiveness this view seems to me open to an objection, which should be fatal to its acceptance. The biological principle of natural selection applies only to the *survival* of a variation, never to its *origin*. Unfortunately, the present problem is purely a problem of the origin of the physical and not at all a problem of its survival. Professor Strong's appeal to evolution would consequently seem to be irrelevant to the issue which he is called upon to meet. Supposing, however, that it is urged in answer

to this objection that all problems of origin are unsolved and that this evolutionary panpsychism is a step forward in that it is a reduction of the mind-body puzzle to a special case of a more general biological problem? I should reply that there was a profound difference between the unknown manner in which a new organic variation originates and the unknown manner in which a physical experience originates from a psychical. For the biological variation is at the worst nothing more than a new arrangement or structure of material elements which were formerly present, while the genesis of physical from psychical involves the appearance of a totally new *quale*. What, for example, should we say to a materialist who should argue that because an animal evolved a stomach that could digest so likewise he might evolve a brain that could feel and think? Yet the same difficulty that prevents us from assenting to the view that sensation is a phase or result of molecular motion in the brain should equally prevent us from assenting to the converse statement that molecular motion is a phenomenon which has resulted from sensation. Anything that would enable us to cross intelligibly from psychical to physical would enable us to cross from physical to psychical. For these reasons I can not feel that Professor Strong's new theory is any genuine answer to the criticism of M. Flournoy. Once grant to the idealist the psychical origin of a physical experience and we can understand its development by natural selection into an elaborate system of atoms and molecules. But the whole difficulty lies in granting this first origin.

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DISCUSSION

DR. BUSH'S DEFINITION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

DR. BUSH in his 'Empirical Definition of Consciousness'¹ handles idealism in an easy, almost disrespectful way that must excite envy in those of his readers to whom the source of his confidence is not as clear as to him. Hence this note of interrogation.

Dr. Bush corrects the idealistic assumption that the subject of consciousness, the knower, is never an object of consciousness. Where a knower exists it is one among the objects of consciousness,

¹ JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, Vol. II., pp. 561 ff.